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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
GUARDIAN STATE BANK, a ] 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
F.C. STANGL I I I , 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
I APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 20158 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant Guardian State Bank ("Guardian") filed this action to 
recover the amount due from Respondent F.C. Stangl ("Stangl") on a 
Promissory Note executed in favor of Guardian dated May 11, 1981, and for 
fraud and declaratory relief. Stangl admitted l iabi l i ty on that Note but 
filed a Counterclaim seeking to recover from Guardian on Guardian's 
indorsement of a previous Promissory Note which Stangl had guaranteed. A 
Third-Party Complaint filed by Guardian against its attorneys for negligence 
in the subject transaction is not involved in this Appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted Stangl's Motion for a directed verdict. 
Judgment was thereafter entered by the Court on June 19, 1984. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Guardian seeks an Order reversing the Judgment below in favor of 
Stangl on his Counterclaim with directions to enter Judgment on the 
Counterclaim in favor of Guardian, and awarding Guardian its attorneys1 fees 
and costs incurred in the Court below and on Appeal. In the alternative, 
Guardian seeks an Order reversing the Judgment and remanding the case for a 
new t r i a l . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Preliminary Statement. 
The directed verdict in favor of Stangl was only proper i f , as a 
matter of law, reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be 
determined from the evidence presented at tr ial so that Stangl was entitled 
to Judgment as a matter of law. The District Court was not free to weigh 
the evidence in deciding the Motion for Directed Verdict and was obligated 
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Guardian. See, e.g., 
Management Committee of Greystone Pines Homeowners Association v. Graystone 
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. Gribble, 513 P.2d 432 
(Utah 1973). 
Most of the facts set forth below are undisputed. In those 
instances where the facts are in dispute, the facts presented by Guardian 
are set forth in accordance with the foregoing standards and Stangl1s 
conflicting testimony is set forth in footnotes. 
B. Facts. 
At all relevant times Stangl was an officer, director and 50% 
shareholder in Sargetis Fine Cars, Inc. (the "dealership"), which owned and 
operated a car dealership in Price, Utah. The other principal of the 
dealership was John Sargetis ("Sargetis"). Stangl also owned the property 
upon which the dealership conducted i t s business and leased that property to 
the dealership. [R. 341; 604, l ine 24 - 605, l ine 1] 
On or about August 28, 1979, the dealership obtained a loan in the 
principal sum of $150,000.00 from Empire State Bank, which was the 
predecessor-in-interest to Guardian. To evidence that loan, the 
dealership executed a Promissory Note (the "original Note") in favor of 
Guardian in the total principal sum of $150,000.00, bearing interest at the 
rate of 1.5% above Chase Manhattan Bank prime, payable upon demand. [Ex. 
D-l; R. 341; 558, lines 17-25] As a condition of making the subject loan, 
both Stangl and Sargetis individually were required to and did execute a 
continuing Guaranty of a l l the debts and obligations owing to Guardian by 
the dealership. [Ex. D-2; 341, 560, l ines 11-24] Stangl understood at the 
time he executed the Guaranty that i f the dealership did not pay the 
original Note, he was obligated to do so. [R. 606, l ines 5-8] 
The dealership subsequently went out of business, and in December 
1980, assigned i t s remaining assets to the National Association of Credit 
Men ("N.A.C.M.") for l iquidation as a Trustee for the benefit of creditors. 
[R. 653, lines 6-11] 
As of April 1981, no principal payments had been made on the 
original Note for approximately one year. [R. 702, l ine 23 - 703, l ine 3 ] . 
In April 1981, Russell Webb, who was then the newly instal led President of 
Guardian, met with Stangl at Guardian's off ices to discuss the delinquent 
1 Empire was merged into Guardian in April 1982 [R. 338] and both 
ent i t ies w i l l hereinafter be referred to as "Guardian". 
_^« 
loan and told Stangl that Stangl, as a Guarantor, would have to pay the 
original Note. Stangl was very cooperative at the meeting and agreed that 
he had a responsibil i ty to pay the original Note. However, Stangl 
represented that he was not in a position to pay the fu l l amount of the Note 
at that time and requested a repayment program whereby Stangl would execute 
a new Promissory Note payable one-half within sixty or ninety days and the 
other half within another year. [R. 555, lines 20-23; 561, l ine 19 - 562, 
l ine 10] Stangl told Mr. Webb he was concerned that by paying of f the Note 
he would lose his r ight to get any recovery from the assets of the 
dealership being liquidated by the N.A.C.M. [R. 626, l ines 19-25] Stangl 
also told Mr. Webb that he wanted Guardian to give him the original Note and 
Guaranty so that he could attempt to col lect from the assets of the 
dealership and from Sargetis indiv idual ly. [R. 510, lines 1-5; 601, Lines 
6-10] These terms were agreed to by Mr. Webb. [R. 628, l ines 1-7] Stangl 
did not t e l l Mr. Webb that he wanted Guardian to indorse the original Note 
to him so that he could impose l i a b i l i t y on Guardian. [R. 514, l ines 11-20; 
600, Line 25 - 601, l ine 10] I f Stangl would have told Mr. Webb that he 
would seek to impose l i a b i l i t y upon Guardian on the original Note, Guardian 
would, of course, not have entered into the transaction. [R. 573, lines 14 -
574, l ine l l ] 2 
Although a l l of the terms with respect to the repayment of the 
original Note were agreed to by Mr. Webb and Stangl d i rect ly , Jerry 
2 Stangl did not contradict this testimony except to contend that during 
the meeting he had i n i t i a l l y objected to paying the original Note 
principal ly because he thought the Note was to be amortized over f ive 
years instead of payable on demand. Stangl specif ical ly acknowledged 
that an agreement had been reached concerning repayment in his meeting 
with Mr. Webb and that he told Mr. Webb he wanted the Note and 
Guaranty to try to col lect from the dealership. [R. 90, l ine 21 - 93, 
l ine 76; 101, l ines 4-13] 
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Dearinger ("Dearinger"), the lawyer for Guardian, and Bruce Maak ("Maak"), 
the lawyer for Stangl, were to document the transaction to conform to the 
agreement reached between Stangl and Guardian. [R. 567, line 22 - 568, line 
6; 629, lines 16-24; 674, lines 17-22] 
Dearinger and Maak subsequently did undertake to document the 
agreement. Dearinger testified that in his conversations with Maak, Maak 
told him that although he had advised Stangl that he thought Stangl had some 
unspecified defenses on the Guaranty, Stangl wanted to go ahead and make 
payment to Guardian on his Guaranty. Maak also told Mr. Dearinger that 
Stangl wanted to protect his good credit in town so he was willing to pay 
the Guaranty, but didn't have the funds to pay i t at that moment, so i f 
transaction was structured so that Stangl could pay the Guaranty over a 
period of time, Stangl would be willing to pay the Guaranty. Maak told 
Dearinger that i f Stangl paid the loan, he should be assigned Guardian's 
rights against the dealership and Sargetis upon the original Note and 
Guaranty, and that the only reason Stangl wanted the original Note and 
Guaranty was so that Stangl could pursue John Sargetis and the dealership. 
[R. 640, line 25 - 642, line 1 ; 645, lines 1-6] Maak told Dearinger that he 
wanted the transaction structured as a purchase of the original Note with a 
new Note to make i t clear the original Note was not being paid off, 
consistent with Stangl's concern that by paying the Note he would forfeit 
any right to recover dealership assets from the N.A.C.M. [R. 670, lines 
4-10]3 
3 Although Maak denied that he ever told Dearinger that the only reason 
Stangl wanted the original Note and Guaranty was to pursue Sargetis 
and the dealership, he acknowledged that he might have told Dearinger 
that was one of the reasons. [R. 686, lines 8-13] Maak also 
acknowledged that he never told Dearinger or Guardian that the reason 
he wanted the original Note and Guaranty in the form he required was 
so that Stangl could hold Guardian liable on its indorsement and 
escape l iabi l i ty to Guardian. [R. 150, lines 18 - 151, line 7] 
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While Stangl intentionally led Guardian to believe that he intended 
to pay his obligation to the Bank on the Guaranty by executing a new 
Promissory Note which would give Stangl additional time for the payment of 
the obligation, Stangl and his attorney in fact had no such intent. Rather, 
Stangl intended to attempt to evade any obligation to Guardian on the 
Guaranty or the new Note by getting Guardian to indorse the original Note 
with recourse, transfer the original Note and Guaranty to Stangl, and then 
hold Guardian liable on its indorsement i f the amount of the original Note 
could not be collected from the dealership. [R. 711, line 22 - 712, line 1; 
671, line 18 - 672, line 6; 695, lines 7-14; 691, lines 6-19; 637, lines 
8-15] 
To carry out this scheme, on May 14, 1981, Stangl paid interest 
current on the original Note in the sum of $8,104.00 and executed a new 
Promissory Note in favor of Guardian in the principal sum of $132,000.00, 
representing the unpaid principal balance of the original Note. The new 
Note provided for interest at the rate of ^% above Chase Manhattan Bank 
prime (one-half percent less than the original Note) and was to be repaid in 
two equal installments on or before July 10, 1981 and July 10, 1982. The 
new Note recited i t was given for the purchase of the original Note. [Ex. 
P-10; R. 342; 632, lines 2-8] Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, 
Guardian at that time also assigned and delivered to Stangl the Guaranty of 
the original Note which Stangl and Sargetis had executed, and the original 
Note itself which was indorsed by Guardian. Guardian's indorsement did not 
contain any indication on its face that i t was without recourse. [Exs. D-1 & 
D-2; R. 342] Immediately upon completing this transaction, i t was Stangl's 
position that he had no further l iabi l i ty to Guardian, which was the result 
he intended the transaction to accomplish. [R. 637, lines 8-15; 711, line 22 
- 712, line 1] Of Course, this position was not communicated to Guardian. 
After Stangl executed the new Promissory Note and acquired the 
original Note and Guaranty from Guardian, Stangl claims to have made some 
minimal efforts to collect the original Note from the assets of the 
dealership and from Sargetis individually. However, no funds were ever 
collected and Stangl never made any payments on the new Note. [R. 680, line 
10 - 681, line 3; 712, lines 15-17] By the Fall of 1981, Stangl undeniably 
knew that the original Note could not be collected from the dealership 
because Ford Motor Credit had a perfected security interest in all of the 
assets of the dealership. [R. 682, lines 10-21] Nevertheless, Stangl made 
no demand upon Guardian for payment of the original Note until approximately 
one year later in September, 1982 in response to a demand by Guardian for 
payment of the new Promissory Note. [R. 342] 
Guardian then commenced this action in the Fall of 1982, seeking to 
recover the amount owing from Stangl on the new Promissory Note. Guardian 
also sought recovery for fraud based on Stangl's misrepresentations and 
omissions which induced Guardian to indorse the original Note and assign the 
Guaranty to Stangl. Finally, Guardian sought declaratory relief with 
respect to the rights of the parties on the original Note and Guaranty. [R. 
2-6] Stangl answered the Complaint admitting l iabi l i ty on the new Note, and 
filed a Counter-claim seeking to recover from Guardian on Guardian's 
indorsement of the original Note in an amount in excess of that which was 
owed to Guardian on the new Note. [R 10-16] 
Some months after the action was f i led, Guardian was granted leave 
to f i le a Third-Party Complaint against its attorneys in the transaction 
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with Stangl, Jerry Dearinger and the firm of Kirton & McConkie. Guardian 
sought recovery from the Third-Party Defendants on the basis that i f Stangl 
was entitled to recover from Guardian on its indorsement of the original 
Note, the Third-Party Defendants were liable to Guardian for negligence. [R. 
101-105] 
The case went to tr ial before a Jury on May 21 - 23, 1984. After 
Guardian and Stangl had rested their cases as against each other, Stangl 
moved for a directed verdict on the basis that as a matter of law Guardian 
was indebted to Stangl on the original Note in an amount in excess of 
Stangl1s l iabi l i ty to Guardian on the new Note. [R. 727, line 12; 728, line 
17] Guardian also moved for a directed verdict. [R. 751, lines 14-20] 
Although the District Court believed that the result was "so grossly 
unfair", the Court did not feel that there was any legal basis upon which to 
grant relief to Guardian and granted Stangl's Motion for Directed Verdict. 
[R. 759, line 23 - 760, line 6] 
The action between Guardian and the Third-Party Defendants was then 
submitted to the jury, which determined that the Third-Party Defendants had 
been 55% negligent with respect to the transaction, that Guardian had been 
45% negligent and that Guardian's damages were $202,021.00. [R. 406-409] 
Thereafter, on June 19, 1984, the Court entered its Judgment in 
favor of Stangl in the net amount of $2,001.69, together with interest and 
in favor of Guardian against the Third-Party Defendants in accordance with 
the jury's verdict in the sum of $106,711.55. [R. 439-441] No appeal has 
been filed with respect to the portion of the Judgment in favor of Guardian 
and against Third-Party Defendants, and that portion of the Judgment has 
been paid. 
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Based upon the foregoing facts and for the reasons hereinafter set 
for th , i t is respectfully submitted that the Distr ict Court's conclusion 
that i t could not deny Stangl the fruits of his well-devised charade was in 
error. Guardian submits that i t is entit led to Judgment as a matter of law, 
or at the yery least to a new t r i a l . 
ARGUMENT 
I . EVEN IF GUARDIAN'S INDORSEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE IS VALID, 
GUARDIAN IS NOT LIABLE TO STANGL. 
Under Section I I of this Brief we demonstrate that Guardian's 
indorsement of the original Note is invalid and unenforceable by Stangl for 
a number of reasons. However, even i f i t is assumed for purposes of 
argument that the indorsement is enforceable, Guardian has no l i a b i l i t y to 
Stangl on the original Note for the reasons set forth below. 
A. Guardian is Entitled to be Subrogated to All Rights of 
Stangl Under the Original Note and Guaranty. 
Stangl's position in this lawsuit is that because Guardian's 
indorsement of the original Note did not recite on i ts face that i t was 
"without recourse" Guardian is l iable for the fu l l amount of that Note as a 
matter of law. Assuming for purposes of argument that the Distr ict Court 
was correct in determining that Guardian is l iable to Stangl on Guardian's 
indorsement of the original Note, Guardian is entit led as a matter of law to 
be subrogated to a l l of Stangl's rights with respect to the indebtedness 
which is the subject of the original Note. Guardian's right of subrogation 
includes the right to recover from both Stangl and Sargetis on the 
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continuing Guaranty of that indebtedness which they executed. Consequently, 
any l iabi l i ty of Guardian on the original Note is offset by Stangl's 
l iabil i ty to Guardian on the Guaranty of that Note. 
Under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code an indorser is a type of 
surety. See, e.g. , First New Haven National Bank v. Clarke, 368 A.2d 613, 
614 (Conn. 1976) ("more than that of any other party to commercial paper, 
the indorser1 s l iabi l i ty is like that of a surety."); 2 Hart & Miller, 
Commercial Paper Under the U.C.C, (1984); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code, p. 426 (1980); Wladis, U.C.C. Art. 3 Suretyship and the 
Holder In Due Course: Requiem for Good Samaritan, 70 Georgetown Law Journal 
975, 979 (1982); Noble, The Surety and Article 3: A New Identity For an Old 
Friend, 19 Duquesne Law Review 245, 261 (1981); U.C.C Sec. 3-606 Comment 5 
("the suretyship defense stated has been generally recognized as available 
to indorsers or accommodation parties.") 
I t has long been the law in this Country, both before and after 
the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted, that once an indorser, surety or 
accommodation party pays a note he stands in the shoes of the creditor and 
is subrogated to all of the creditor's rights not only on the note but on 
the underlying obligation. For example, in N. J. Gendron Lumber v. Great 
Northern Homes, 395 N.E.2d 457 (Mass. 1979), the Court held that an indorser 
who had paid a promissory note could not only recover against the maker but 
against a guarantor of the obligation represented by the Note. See also, 
Halpin v. Fankenberger, 644 P.2d 452 (Kan. 1982); Reimann v. Hybertsen, 550 
P.2d 436 (Ore. 1976); Simpson v. Bilderbeck, Inc., 417 P.2d 803 (N.M. 1966); 
Alavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Development Co., 371 So.2d 755 (La. 
1979); Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. McGraw, 259 N.W. 507 (1935); 
-10-
Miami Mortgage & Guaranty Co. v. Drawdy, 127 So. 323 (Fla. 1930); Northern 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Slater, Walt & Co., 212 P. 1063 (Wash. 1923); Wallace v. 
Jones, 72 A. 769 (Md. 1909); Hartzell v. McClurg, 74 N.W. 626 (Neb. 1898); 
The Surety and Article 3: A New Identity For an Old Friend, 19 Duquesne Law 
Review 245, 261 (1981); Simpson on Suretyship, Sec. 47 (1950); U.C.C. Sec. 
3-606, Comment 1 (recognizing that a surety has a "right of recourse either 
on the instrument or dehors i t . " ) 
The right of an indorser upon payment of a note to all of the 
creditor1s rights in the note and the underlying obligation is simply one 
application of the principle of equitable subrogation. That principle is 
not displaced by the Code, but supplements its provisions. Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 70A-1-103. The purpose of subrogation was set forth by this 
Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202 (lit. 1980) as 
follows: 
"Subrogation is a creature of equity, its purpose is to 
work out an equitable adjustment between the parties by 
securing the ultimate discharge of a debt by the person 
who, in equity and in good conscience ought to pay i t . " 
Another author describes the principle as follows: 
"Upon his payment of the principal's debt, the surety has 
the right to be substituted to the position of the creditor 
whom he pays. This is known as the surety's right of 
subrogation. Whether or not the surety upon payment has 
taken an assignment from the creditor of the latter1s 
rights, equity will treat him as an assignee. Subrogation 
is equitable assignment. . . . Subrogation entitles the 
surety to use any remedy against the principal which the 
creditor could have used, and in general to enjoy the 
benefit of any advantage that the creditor had, such as 
. . . to proceed against a third person who has promised 
eitherThe principal or the creditor to pay the debt." 
Simpson on Suretyship, supra., at p. 205. [Emphasis added] 
Similarly, in Moyer v. Colyer, 283 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1955), the 
Court observed: 
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"What rights did the sureties have upon payment of the note 
in question? As a general rule where a bi l l or note has 
been paid by a party who is only secondarily liable, the 
party paying will be subrogated to all rights and remedies 
which were available to the holder or owner of the 
instrument in order to obtain payment thereof." (Id. at 
818) 
In the present case, Stangl was clearly a primary obligor on 
the debt pursuant to his written Guaranty. See, Ex. D-2; Strevell-Paterson 
Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Ut. 1982). The evidence produced by 
Stangl in the Court below did not even approach raising any defense to the 
Guaranty. The only purported defense raised by Stangl was that sometime 
after the August 1979 transaction in which he signed the guaranty, he was 
told that the original Note would be amortized over five years when, in 
fact, the Note was payable on demand. I t is totally irrelevant what Stangl 
was told after he had already obligated himself on the Guaranty. More 
importantly, even i f the original Note had been payable in installments over 
a period of five years, the evidence was undisputed that the installments 
were not paid and in fact no principal had been paid on the original Note 
for a year before demand was made on Stangl on his Guaranty. Therefore, 
Guardian legally had the right to accelerate the original Note pursuant to 
the acceleration provision contained therein and demand payment in fu l l . 
Kixx, Inc. v. Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385 (Ut. 1980); Commercial 
Security Bank v. Corporation Nine, 600 P.2d 1000 (Ut. 1979). 
Consequently, even i f Guardian is liable as an indorser of the 
original Note, Guardian is subrogated to all Stangl's rights in the original 
Note and Guaranty and is entitled to collect the full amount of the original 
Note from Stangl based on the Guaranty. The l iabi l i t ies , therefore, offset 
each other as a matter of law. 
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B. Any Liability of Guardian on its Indorsement Was Discharged 
When Stangl Acquired the Original Note. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-208 provides: 
"Where an instrument is returned to or re-acquired 
by a prior party . . .any intervening party is 
discharged as against the re-acquiring party, and 
subsequent holders not in due course . . . " 
Pursuant to this statute, where a prior party to a Promissory Note 
re-acquires the Note, a subsequent indorser is discharged. Hewett v. Marine 
Midland Bank, 449 NYS2d 745 (1982); Cop!an Pipe & Supply Co. v. Ben-Frieda 
Corp., 256 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1972). 
The courts are divided on the issue of whether one who signs a 
separate guaranty of a Promissory Note, as Stangl did in this case, is a 
"party" to that Note for the purposes of Article 3 of the Commercial Code. 
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the better reasoned cases have 
held that one who signs a separate guaranty of a Promissory Note is, as to 
the immediate parties to the transaction, a party to that Note. See, e.g., 
Commerce Bank of St. Louis v. Wright, 645 S.W.2d 17 (Miss. 1982); Provident 
Bank v. Gast, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (Ohio 1979). Thus, in Commerce Bank of St. 
Louis, supra., the Court observed that there was "no logical reason" not to 
treat a guarantor who signed a separate document guaranteeing a Promissory 
Note as a party to that Promissory Note and concluded: 
"The defendant guarantors were parties to the instrument 
even though their guaranty was a separate document, or 
dehors the note itself, since they were known participants 
in the loan/stock purchase transaction of which the note 
and guaranty were contemporaneous, integrated events." 
[645 S.W.2d at 21] [Emphasis added] 
4 Insofar as Guardian can determine, this Court has never decided the 
issue. 
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As between the obligors on a negotiable instrument and their 
immediate obligee, the terms of the instrument must be interpreted together 
with any other agreements executed as part of the same transaction. Utah 
Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-119(l). The Commercial Code recognizes that as 
between the immediate parties a negotiable instrument is merely a contract, 
that ordinary contract principles apply and that the courts will look to the 
entire agreement between the parties to ascertain their rights and 
obligations. Se£, U.C.C., Sec. 3-119, Comment 3; Gensplit Finance Corp., v. 
Link Power and Machinery Corp., 36 U.C.C. Reporting Service 588 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). 
For example, in Gensplit Finance Corp., Plaintiff sought recovery 
based upon Defendant's unrestricted indorsement of two Promissory Notes. 
The Court denied Plaintiff 's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that 
parole evidence was admissible to show that the Notes were indorsed pursuant 
to a separate agreement between the parties which severely limited 
Defendant's l iab i l i ty , stating: 
"It is well established that, as between immediate parties, 
a negotiable instrument—or, indeed, its indorsement—is 
merely a contract . . . which purpose the court must 
attempt to carry out. As between these two parties, the 
purpose should not be drawn merely from the indorsement on 
the Veko notes. Before us is a transferree who seeks full 
recovery against its immediate transferor by inviting our 
attention only to two documents on the grounds they are 
promissory notes. . . . [W]e decline this invitation, and, 
thus deny plaintiff 's Motion for Summary Judgment." [36 
U.C.C. Reporting Service at 593-594] [Emphasis added] 
As between the immediate parties to the original Note in this 
case, there simply is no logical reason why Stangl's rights and obligations 
should hinge on the question of which piece of paper he signed his 
guaranty. Both the original Note and Guaranty must be read together in 
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determining the rights and obligations of the parties. Stangl's l i a b i l i t y 
for payment of the original Note to Guardian was the same as i f he had 
signed his name on the back of the original Note with the words "payment 
guaranteed". Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-416(l) and (5); Strevell 
Patterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982); Hopkins v. F i rs t 
National Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343 (Texas 1977). In either event, Stangl would 
have been an original obligor on the indebtedness represented by that 
Promissory Note. Rice v. Traveler's Express Co., 407 S.W.2d 534 (Texas 
5 
1966). Therefore, Stangl should be treated no di f ferent ly than i f his 
guaranty was contained on the Note i t s e l f . Viewed in th is manner, Stangl fs 
reacquisition of the Note discharged Guardian's l i a b i l i t y as a subsequent 
indorser as a matter of law under the authorities cited above. 
Final ly, even i f this Court chooses not to follow those cases 
which have held one who signs a separate guaranty to be a technical party to 
the Promissory Note, i t is nevertheless submitted that the same rationale 
under which a prior party to a Promissory Note is not l iable to a subsequent 
party applies in this case to prevent Stangl from charging Guardian with 
l i a b i l i t y on i t s indorsement. Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-414, 
indorsers are l iab le to one another in the order in which they indorse a 
Promissory Note which is presumed to be the order in which thei r signatures 
appear on the Note. The rationale of Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-3-208 
quoted above is that since a prior party on a Note is l iable to the 
5 In fact , Stangl's l i a b i l i t y to Guardian was no different that i f he 
had been a co-maker of the Note. In th is regard, where a co-maker 
pays and reacquires a Note, l i a b i l i t y of a l l persons on the Note is 
discharged. Bourg v. Wiley, 398 S.2d 13 (La. 1981). 
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subsequent indorser, the prior party should not be able to improve his 
position by acquiring the Note and then seeking to impose l iabi l i ty on the 
subsequent indorser. U.C.C. Sec. 3-208, Comment 1. In the case at bar, 
prior to acquiring the original Note, Stangl was clearly liable to Guardian 
for payment of the Note. Stangl should not be allowed to improve his 
position as against Guardian by acquiring the Note. 
C. An Accommodation Party is Not Liable to the Party 
Accommodated. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-415(5), an accommodation 
party is not liable to the party accommodated. In the present case, 
Guardian was merely an accommodation indorser because Guardian indorsed the 
original Note solely to allow Stangl to attempt to collect against the 
maker. As against Stangl, i t is clear that parole evidence is admissible to 
prove Guardian indorsed for accommodation only. Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 
70A-3-415(3); U.C.C. Sec. 3-415, Comment 1. 
Gibbs Hoy! Co. v. Collentro and Collentro, Inc., 252 N.E.2d 217 
(Mass. 1969) is closely on point. In Gibbs, the payee on a Promissory Note 
sought to recover from an indorser. The indorser presented parole evidence 
that he had only indorsed the Note to enable the payee to discount the 
Note. The court held that the indorser was not liable because an 
accommodation indorser is not liable to the party accommodated. See, also, 
Deems v. Wilson, 151 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. 1966); United Refrigerator v. 
Applebaum, 189 A.2d 253 (Penn. 1963); Gensplit Finance Corp. v. Link Power 
and Machinery Corp., supra. 
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Stangl undeniably knew that Guardian only indorsed the original 
Note to enable Stangl to collect from the dealership and Sargetis. Hence, 
Guardian is entit led to Judgment as a matter of law. And, even i f some 
factual issue exists as to whether Guardian was an accommodation indorser, 
the Distr ict Court clearly erred in not submitting the question to the Jury. 
I I . GUARDIAN'S INDORSEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE IS INVALID AND 
UNENFORCEABLE. 
Even i f , contrary to what is argued above, Guardian's indorsement 
of the original Note, on i ts face, rendered Guardian l iable to Stangl, that 
indorsement is invalid and unenforceable by Stangl because: (a) Guardian was 
fraudulently induced to indorse the original Note; (b) the original Note and 
Guaranty were only delivered to Stangl for the special purpose of collecting 
against the dealership and Sargetis; (c) Guardian indorsed the original Note 
and assigned the Guaranty based upon a mistake of fact induced and known by 
Stangl; (d) Stangl gave no consideration to Guardian to acquire the original 
note and Guaranty; and (e) Stangl did not act in good fai th in the 
transaction. The Distr ict Court should have directed a verdict for Guardian 
on these issues, or, at the very least , should have submitted these issues 
to the Jury. 
At the outset, i t should be noted that the parties stipulated below 
that Stangl was not a holder in Due Course of the original Note. Thus, any 
defense that is a defense to a simple contract constitutes a defense to 
Stangl's enforcement of Guardian's indorsement of that Note. Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-306. 
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A. Guardian Was Defrauded Into Delivering the Original Note 
and Guaranty to Stangl. 
The evidence was undisputed in the Court below that the 
original Note and Guaranty were transferred to Stangl in reliance upon his 
representation that he simply wanted all of Guardian's rights in the 
original Note and Guaranty to attempt collection from the dealership and 
Sargetis. Contrary to what Guardian was intentionally led to believe, 
Stangl's admitted intent throughout the transaction was to evade l iabi l i ty 
to Guardian by obtaining Guardian's indorsement on the original Note and 
holding Guardian liable on that indorsement. The evidence was also 
undisputed that Stangl had no intention of paying the new Note of May 11, 
1981 at the time he executed the new Note unless and until he collected the 
original Note. 
1. Misrepresentation concerning purpose of acquiring 
original Note and Guaranty. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Berkeley Bank For Co-ops v. 
Meibose, 607 P.2d 798 (Ut. 1980), is similar to the case at bar. In 
Berkeley, this Court held that Defendants were not liable on promissory 
notes which they had executed because the purpose of those notes had been 
misrepresented. In so holding, this Court observed: 
" . . . A statement of future intention is actionable i f a 
fraudulent intention existed at the time the deceitful 
statement was made, [citations omitted] In the instant 
case the jury found the necessary fraudulent intent at the 
time that representations as to future conduct were made by 
the defendant. 
. . . 
"It can hardly be maintained that the general moral 
level of business and other financial relationships would 
be enhanced by a rule of law which would allow a person to 
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defend against a wi l l fu l , deliberate fraud by stating, 'you 
should not have trusted or believed me1 or 'had you not 
been so gullible you would not have been [so] deceived.1 
[citations omitted] The rules governing fraud should 
foster intercourse based on trust, forthrightness, and 
honesty." (jd^ at 805.) 
In the Court below, Stangl argued that no cause of action 
for fraud existed because Stangl had never expressly told Guardian that he 
would not seek to impose l iabi l iy on Guardian by virtue of its indorsement 
and that Stangl had no duty to affirmatively disclose that such was his 
intention. This argument is not in accord with the law. Once Stangl 
undertook to tel l Guardian why he wanted the original Note and Guaranty, he 
was obligated to tel l Guardian the whole truth and not to mislead or deceive 
Guardian by omitting material facts. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, 
Inc., 212 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1968); Daive v. American Universal Insurance Co., 
417 A.2d 2 (N.H. 1980); Heise v. Pilot Rock Lumber Co., 352 P.2d 1072 (Ore. 
1960); Simpson v. Western National Bank of Casper, 497 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1972). 
This principle was recognized by the court in Heise v. 
Pilot Rock Lumber Co., supra., at p. 1078, where the Court stated: 
"'Though a buyer is not bound to answer a seller fs 
inquiries relative to the property being purchased and 
sold, in the absence of special circumstances, yet i f he 
does answer, he must answer truthfully, [citations 
omitted] He must make a full and fair disclosure and not 
conceal pertinent or material information. . . . 
. . . 
" . . . 'Fraud may be predicated upon an equivocal, 
evasive, or misleading answer calculated to convey a false 
impression even though i t may be l i teral ly true as far as 
i t goes. A partial and fragmentary disclosure accompanied 
by willful concealment of material and qualifying facts is 
not a true statement and is often as much a fraud as an 
actual representation.1" 
Similarly, in Simpson v. Western National Bank of Casper, 
supra., at p. 880, the Court observed: 
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" ' I t Is certainly true that any active conduct or words 
which tend to produce an erroneous Impression may amount to 
fraud, and half the truth may be a l ie In effect. 
"Even when a party Is under no duty to speak regarding a 
matter, i f he does speak, he must speak the truth and make 
a full and fair disclosure. 
• • • 
"If in addition to the party's silence there is any 
statement, even any word or act on his part, which tends 
affirmatively to a~ suppression of the truth, to a covering 
up or disguising the truth, or to a withdrawal or 
distraction of the other party's attention or observation 
from the real facts, then the line is overstepped, and the 
concealment becomes fraudulent.1" [Emphasis addedj 
Stangl's admitted purpose in seeking to obtain the original 
Note and Guaranty was to totally escape any l iabi l i ty on his Guaranty. He 
suppressed this fact from Guardian and disguised his real intent for one 
obvious reason: Stangl knew i f he told Guardian the true reason he wanted 
the original Note and Guaranty, Guardian would never have agreed to the 
transaction and would have immediately sued him on his Guaranty. Although 
Stangl's scheme was undeniably clever, i t was nevertheless fraudulent. 
2. Misrepresentation of intent to pay the new May 11, 1981 
Note. 
Stangl also fraudulently induced Guardian to indorse the 
original Note and assign the Guaranty to him by Stangl's fraudulent conduct 
in executing the new Note of May 11, 1981. 
By executing the new Note, Stangl unconditionally promised 
to pay Guardian $132,000.00 together with interest, payable in two 
installments on or before July 10, 1981 and July 10, 1982. Contrary to the 
promise contained in the new Note, Stangl in fact admittedly had no 
intention whatsoever of paying any portion of that Note unless, until and 
only to the extent he collected the original Note. While intentionally 
leading Guardian to believe that he intended to honor his obligation on the 
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Guaranty by paying the new Note, Stangl in fact made the promise contained 
in the new Note simply as part of his well disguised charade aimed at 
evading his legal obligation on his Guaranty. Stangl's scheme of promising 
to pay the new Note when he had absolutely no intention of performing that 
promise constituted clear, palpable fraud on his part. Berkeley Bank for 
Co-ops v. Meibose, supra.; Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174 (N.H. 1978). 
B. The Original Note and Guaranty Were Only Delivered to 
Stangl to Allow Him to Attempt Collection Against the Other Parties. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-306, Guardian is not 
liable to Stangl on the indorsement of the original Note i f , as Guardian 
contends, that Note was only given to Stangl for the special purpose of 
enabling Stangl to attempt to collect from the dealership and Sargetis. 
That special purpose may be proven by parole evidence. Berkeley Bank for 
Co-ops v. Meibos, supra; Ventures, Inc. v. Jones, 623 P.2d 145 (Ida. 1981). 
Thus, in the Ventures, Inc. case, the Court held that 
Defendants were not liable on certain promissory notes because there had 
been an oral agreement that the notes were simply given as additional 
interim security for an underlying debt and that the notes would only be in 
effect until a second mortgage was substituted on the property. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court observed: 
"Post-UCC cases interpreting Chapter 3 have generally held 
that one not a holder in due course takes a note subject to 
the defense that delivery was for a special purpose only 
and that proof of such delivery pursuant to an alleged 
collateral agreement is not precluded by the parole 
evidence rule, [citations omitted]" (Id. at 149) 
Similarly, in American Under. Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Tr. 
Co., 303 A.2d 121 (R.I . 1973), the Court held the Defendant bank was not 
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liable on its unrestricted indorsement of a draft because the draft had only 
been delivered for a special purpose, which purpose could be proven by 
parole evidence. 
The undisputed evidence presented by Guardian in the Court 
below compels the conclusion the original Note was only delivered to Stangl 
to allow him to pursue collection from the other parties liable. Indeed, 
unless the agreement between the parties is so interpreted, the agreement 
was an absurdity in that Guardian released Stangl from an indebtedness of 
$132,000 and agreed to affirmatively be liable to Stangl for substantial 
sums. In this regard, where there is a choice, a contract should be 
interpreted to bring about an equitable result rather than a harsh or 
inequitable one. Wingets Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007 (Ut. 1972). 
Further, an interpretation of a contract which renders the contract an 
absurdity or illusory should be avoided. Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. 
DeLorean, 640 P.2d 343 (Kan. 1982); Marathon Steel Co. v. Tilley Steel, 
Inc., 136 Cal.Rptr. 73 (1977). Finally, the l i teral terms of a contract may 
be qualified by the context, purpose and circumstances of the contract to 
make i t a rational instrument. Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, Inc. v. Mass. 
Port Authority, 387 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1979). 
C. Guardian's Indorsement Should Be Reformed or Rescinded 
Because of Mistake of Fact. 
Guardian indorsed the original Note because i t was under the 
belief that Stangl was agreeing to pay his obligation under the Guaranty and 
was only getting the original Note and Guaranty in order to attempt to 
collect the same from the dealership and Sargetis. Stangl knew of 
-22-
Guardian's mistaken belief and in fact Stangl induced that belief. 
Consequently, Guardian's indorsement should be reformed so that the 
indorsement is "without recourse" or, at the very least, Guardian's 
indorsement should be rescinded. 
I t is well-settled in Utah that a party to a contract is 
entitled to reformation of the contract where the contract does not in fact 
correctly embody the oral agreement of the parties, the complaining party 
entered into the contract based upon unilateral mistake and the other parly 
engaged in inequitable conduct. Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Ut. 1980); 
McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 502 (Ut. 1952); Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 
769 (Ut. 1951). I t is respectfully submitted that reformation is most 
appropriate in this case. Stangl represented he simply wanted the original 
Note to go after the dealership and Sargetis, Guardian agreed to give him 
the original Note for that purpose and Stangl knew that was the agreement 
Guardian intended to enter into with him. Under such circumstances, Stangl 
should be held to that agreement. 
The circumstances under which the unilateral mistake of one 
party to a contract can form the basis for rescission of that contract were 
discussed by this Court in the recent case of Tolboe Construction Co. v. 
Staker Paving & Construction Co,, 682 P.2d 843 (Ut. 1984). There, the 
Defendant had submitted a paving bid which was substantially lower than any 
of the other bids received by Plaintiff. After receiving the bid, the 
Plaintiff called Defendant, told Defendant the bid was low and that 
Defendant should review the bid. Defendant subsequently re-examined its 
calculations and reconfinned the bid to Plaintiff. Nevertheless, this Court 
held that the Plaintiff could not enforce the bid against Defendant, stating: 
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"'[Knowledge by one party that the other Is acting under 
mistake Is treated as equivalent to mutual mistake for 
purposes of rescission.1 [citations omitted] Relief from 
mistaken bids is consistently allowed when one party knows 
or has reason to know of the other's error and the 
requirements for rescission are fu l f i l led. 
"Likewise, under the latter doctrine (palpable mistake), 
i f the offeree caused, knew of, should have known of or had 
reason to know of the offerer's mistake, the mistake is 
'palpable1 and as such may be rescinded by the offerer." 
(Id. at 846) 
The Tolboe Court went on to note that, "where an offer is so inconsistent 
with the true value of the bargain that a reasonable person would know the 
offerer made a mistake in his evaluation" then offeree should be charged 
with knowledge of the mistake. To the same effect, see Ashworth v. 
Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724 (Ut. 1951); Puget Sound National Bank v. 
Selivanoff, 514 P.2d 175 (Wash. 1973); 13 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1548 
(3rd Ed. 1970); Restatement of Contracts 2d, Sec. 153. 
In arguing the Motion for Directed Verdict, Stangl contended for 
the f i rst time that Guardian was not entitled to equitable relief on the 
basis of mistake because by suing on the new Note Guardian had elected its 
remedy. I t is respectfully submitted this contention is without merit. 
In the f i rst place, Guardian sought declaratory relief as to the 
rights and l iabi l i t ies of the parties on the original Note. In deciding the 
declaratory relief cause of action the Court was required to achieve 
complete justice between the parties even i f that meant granting relief not 
specifically prayed for by a party. Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of 
Guide Dogs, 432 P.2d 717, 721 (Cal. 1967). A request for declaratory relief 
is equitable in nature and a Court is authorized to grant any equitable 
relief, such as reformation or rescission, even i f not specifically 
requested. Seventeen Hundred Peoria, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 422 P.2d 840, 
844 (Okla. 1966); Benton v. Benton, 528 P.2d 1244 (Kan. 1974). 
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Second, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
Court is empowered to grant any relief to which a party is entitled based on 
the evidence and is not limited by the prayer of the Complaint. Pope v. 
Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Ut. 1978); Palombi v. D & C Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Ut. 
1969); Smith v. Zepp, 567 P.2d 923 (Mont. 1977). Specifically, a Court may 
grant equitable relief such as reformation or rescission where appropriate 
even though damages have been sought. cjF, Garland v. Garland, 165 F.2d 131 
(10th Cir. 1948). 
D. Stangl Gave No Consideration for Guardian's Indorsement of the 
Original Note. 
Stangl cannot impose l iabi l i ty upon Guardian on its indorsement of 
the original Note because Stangl gave no consideration to Guardian for the 
original Note and Guaranty. As of the time he received the original Note 
and Guaranty, Stangl was absolutely obligated to Guardian to pay the debt by 
virtue of his Guaranty. Consequently, Stangl1 s execution of the new Note 
whereby he promised to pay the debt in the future, rather than immediately 
as he was obligated to do under the Guaranty, did not constitute 
consideration for Guardian's indorsement of the Note. 
For example, in Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Ut. 1974), this 
Court held that the Defendant's promise to pay three $200.00 payments which 
he was already obligated to make to Plaintiff, did not constitute 
consideration for Plaintiff 's agreement to relieve him from the payment of 
any further support money. The Court opined: 
". . .we cannot see wherein the defendant gave any 
consideration for the claimed agreement that he would not 
have to pay any future support money. That is , he neither 
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gave anything of value, nor suffered any legal detriment 
for that promise. Under the decree he was already 
obligated to make the payments of $200.00 per month. Such 
an agreement to do that which one is already required to do 
does not constitute consideration for a new promise." [Id. 
at 143] ~ 
Even i f Stangl had some colorable defense to enforcement of the 
Guaranty so that his l iabi l i ty on the Guaranty was doubtful and disputed, 
Stangl s t i l l gave no consideration because i f Stangl can recover on the 
indorsement he unilaterally improved his position rather than suffering any 
legal detriment or conferring on Guardian any legal benefit. 
As of the May 1981 transaction, Guardian had a claim against 
Stangl on the Guaranty which at the very least represented a serious 
l iabi l i ty to Stangl. Assuming for purposes of argument that Stangl's view 
of the law is correct with respect to Guardian's l iabi l i ty on its 
indorsement, by entering into the transaction with Guardian he completely 
extinguished any l iabi l i ty on the Guaranty. Further, Guardian was 
immediately liable to Stangl on its indorsement of the original Note for an 
amount in excess of Stangl1s l iabi l i ty on the new Note. Consequently, 
the net effect of the transaction was to immediately erase any l iabi l i ty of 
Stangl to Guardian and to immediately create a substantial debt from 
Guardian to Stangl. Further, because the original Note provided for 
interest at a higher rate than the new Note, Guardian's l iabi l i ty to Stangl 
6
 Under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 70A-3-501 (4), i f Guardian's 
indorsement is otherwise enforceable, Stangl had no obligation to 
attempt to collect the original Note from any other party before 
demanding payment from Guardian and Guardian was immediately liable on 
its indorsement. 
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would continue increasing as time passed. Simply put, Stangl did not intend 
to nor did he suffer any legal detriment or confer any legal benefit on 
Guardian. 
E. Stangl Cannot Hold Guardian Liable On Its Indorsement 
Because He Did Not Act In Good Faith. 
Under the Commercial Code, every contract or duty imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 70A-1-203. "Good faith" is defined by the Code to mean 
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 70A-1-201 (19). Where a party to a contract fails to act in 
good faith he cannot enforce the specific provisions of the contract which 
are affected by his lack of good faith. See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. 
McNabb, 381 F.Supp. 181 (D. Tenn. 1974); Eckstein v. Cummins, 321 N.E.2d 897 
(Oh. 1974). 
Stangl's conduct in the present transaction didn't even 
approach a standard of good faith under any definition. At the very time he 
was entering into a transaction designed to lead Guardian to believe he 
would pay his obligation, Stangl secretly intended to evade that obligation 
all together. The Commercial Code was not intended to reward bad faith, no 
matter how cleverly disguised. 
I I I . GUARDIAN SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Both the new Note and the Guaranty provide for attorneys1 fees to 
be awarded Guardian in the event of legal action. Consequently, Guardian 
should be awarded its attorneys1 fees incurred both in the Court below and 
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on appeal i f this Court reverses the District Court's Judgment and directs 
that Judgment be entered in favor of Guardian. Management Services v. 
Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406 (Ut. 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Stangl played an ingenious "shell game" with Guardian. I f Stangl's 
position is correct, he strolled into Guardian's office in May of 1981 owing 
Guardian in excess of $130,000 and walked out a few minutes later not only 
being free of debt to Guardian but with Guardian actually owing him money, 
all the while making Guardian believe he had agreed to pay his obligation 
like a good, honest businessman. 
The District Court reluctantly concluded that i t could not deny 
Stangl the fruits of his charade even though the result was "so grossly 
unfair". However, the governing principles behind the Commercial Code and 
contractual relations in general do not sanction the absurd, illusory and 
inequitable result for which Stangl contends. Whether this case is viewed 
from the standpoint of the technical effect of Guardian's indorsement of the 
original Note or viewed from the standpoint of the enforceability of that 
indorsement, Stangl is not entitled to evade his obligation which now stands 
at over $200,000. 
There can be no doubt that Stangl led Guardian to believe that by 
executing the new Note in the May 1981 transaction, he was agreeing to pay 
his obligation to Guardian strictly in accordance with the terms of that 
Note, and that Stangl knew that was the result Guardian intended from the 
transaction. I t is respectfully submitted that for the reasons hereinabove 
set forth, this Court should hold that this result is precisely what the 
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transaction did in fact accomplish and that the Judgment on the original 
Note in favor of Stangl should be reversed with directions to enter Judgment 
in favor of Guardian together with reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
In this regard, Guardian submits that for complete justice to be 
done in this case, the amount of the Judgment in favor of Guardian should be 
the full balance of the new Note without any credit for the amount of 
damages awarded against the Third-Party Defendants on condition that any 
amounts collected by Guardian over and above what Guardian is now out of 
pocket be paid directly to the Third-Party Defendants to reimburse them for 
what they have paid Guardian. I f this Court declines to so rule, then 
Judgment should be entered in favor of Guardian for the remaining balance of 
the new Note after crediting the payment from the Third-Party Defendants. 
DATED this ff^fay of October, 1984. 
BURBIDGE&IMITCHELL 
ST^IEN B. MlTXlm 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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